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Analysts’ earnings forecasts coexistence and dynamics of overconfidence and strategic incentives

Analysts’ earnings forecasts coexistence and dynamics of overconfidence and strategic incentives

 Bosqueta, Katrien.
 Routledge, Taylor & Francis , 2015.
 London, Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales] Abingdon, UK : pages 307-322. Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales. English ISSN: 00014788
AccountingBusinessConflicts of interestEarnings forecastsFinancial analystsG14, G17, G24Overconfidence
Tác giả CN Bosqueta, Katrien.
Nhan đề Analysts’ earnings forecasts: coexistence and dynamics of overconfidence and strategic incentives / Katrien Bosqueta, Peter de Goeijb* & Kristien Smedtsc.
Thông tin xuất bản London, Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales] Abingdon, UK :Routledge, Taylor & Francis ,2015.
Mô tả vật lý pages 307-322.
Tùng thư Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales.
Tóm tắt This paper formulates a two-stage model to capture the decision process of financial analysts when issuing earnings forecasts. Our model extends the model of Chen and Jiang [(2005). Analysts’ weighting of private and public information. Review of Financial Studies, 19 (1), 319–355], by allowing for a distortion of forecasts independent of whether an analyst has private information. Using quarterly earnings forecasts, we provide empirical evidence on the coexistence of overconfidence and strategic incentives. Financial analysts overweight their private information and at the same time strategically inflate their forecast.
Thuật ngữ chủ đề Accounting-Periodicals.
Thuật ngữ chủ đề Business-Periodicals.
Thuật ngữ chủ đề Accounting-Research-Periodicals.
Từ khóa tự do Conflicts of interest
Từ khóa tự do Earnings forecasts
Từ khóa tự do Financial analysts
Từ khóa tự do G14, G17, G24
Từ khóa tự do Overconfidence
Tác giả(bs) CN Aleksanyan, Mark.
Tác giả(bs) CN Bahtsevanoglou, John.
Nguồn trích Accounting and Business Research.- Volume 45, N3, 2015.
MARC
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245[1 0] |a Analysts’ earnings forecasts: coexistence and dynamics of overconfidence and strategic incentives / |c Katrien Bosqueta, Peter de Goeijb* & Kristien Smedtsc.
260[ ] |a London, Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales] Abingdon, UK : |b Routledge, Taylor & Francis , |c 2015.
300[ ] |a pages 307-322.
362[0 ] |a Vol. 45, N.3 (2015)
490[ ] |a Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales.
520[ ] |a This paper formulates a two-stage model to capture the decision process of financial analysts when issuing earnings forecasts. Our model extends the model of Chen and Jiang [(2005). Analysts’ weighting of private and public information. Review of Financial Studies, 19 (1), 319–355], by allowing for a distortion of forecasts independent of whether an analyst has private information. Using quarterly earnings forecasts, we provide empirical evidence on the coexistence of overconfidence and strategic incentives. Financial analysts overweight their private information and at the same time strategically inflate their forecast.
650[0 0] |a Accounting |v Periodicals.
650[0 0] |a Business |v Periodicals.
650[1 0] |a Accounting |x Research |v Periodicals.
653[0 ] |a Conflicts of interest
653[0 ] |a Earnings forecasts
653[0 ] |a Financial analysts
653[0 ] |a G14, G17, G24
653[0 ] |a Overconfidence
700[1 ] |a Aleksanyan, Mark.
700[1 ] |a Bahtsevanoglou, John.
773[ ] |t Accounting and Business Research. |g Volume 45, N3, 2015.
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