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实践理性、公共理由与正义观念的辩护 =

实践理性、公共理由与正义观念的辩护 = : Practical Reason,Public Reasons and Justification for Justice

 CHEN, Xiao-sheng.
 语言文字工作委员会 , 2015.
 新疆维吾尔自治区乌鲁木齐市 : 129-141+159-160 pages. 中文 ISSN: 10077278
罗尔斯哈贝马斯公共理由公共辩护合情理性理性重叠共识.
Tác giả CN CHEN, Xiao-sheng.
Nhan đề 实践理性、公共理由与正义观念的辩护 = Practical Reason,Public Reasons and Justification for Justice /CHEN Xiao-sheng.
Thông tin xuất bản 新疆维吾尔自治区乌鲁木齐市 :语言文字工作委员会 ,2015.
Mô tả vật lý 129-141+159-160 pages.
Tóm tắt Influenced by Kant’s concept of practical reason,both Rawls and Habermas try to develop,through social contract procedure or ideal speech situation,Kant’s categorical imperative procedure,which is regarded as the demand of the practical reason itself,so as to establish a normative framework for regulating the public use of reason. However,they have different opinions on how to set up this framework. Habermas believes that a normative consensus should be formed on the bases of the same public reasons and under the ideal debilitative conditions;whereas Rawls argues that,in the justification of justice,the original deliberation of a "monologue"kind does not necessarily prevent the expression of the impartial moral point of view.What the citizens have achieved as a consensus,with yet incongruous concerns,is actually their requirement for a kind of public justification of complete and unified practical reason,under the condition of reasonable pluralism.
Tóm tắt 罗尔斯与哈贝马斯都深受康德的实践理性观念影响,试图通过契约程序或理想商谈情境去阐发被康德认为是体现了实践理性本身要求的绝对命令程序,来为理性的公共运用确立一个规范框架。他们在关于正义观念的辩护问题上的著名论争,实质是对于何种程序设置才能合理地反映一种不偏不倚的道德观点的分歧。哈贝马斯认为必须在理想商谈条件下经由公民平等讨论后在相同的公共理由之上形成的共识,才具有道德规范性;罗尔斯认为,在其对正义观念的辩护中,原初代表的"独白式"慎思并不必然会阻碍对不偏不倚道德观点的体现;并且公民基于各自的理由在正义观念上达成重叠共识,是合理多元条件下面向公民的完整统一的实践理性为正义观念作辩护的要求。
Từ khóa tự do 罗尔斯
Từ khóa tự do 哈贝马斯
Từ khóa tự do 公共理由
Từ khóa tự do 公共辩护
Từ khóa tự do 合情理性
Từ khóa tự do 理性
Từ khóa tự do 重叠共识.
Nguồn trích 南京大学学报(哲学·人文科学·社会科学), Journal of Nanjing University- No. 3, 2015
MARC
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245[1 0] |a 实践理性、公共理由与正义观念的辩护 = |b Practical Reason,Public Reasons and Justification for Justice / |c CHEN Xiao-sheng.
260[ ] |a 新疆维吾尔自治区乌鲁木齐市 : |b 语言文字工作委员会 , |c 2015.
300[ ] |a 129-141+159-160 pages.
362[0 ] |a No. 3 (2015)
520[ ] |a Influenced by Kant’s concept of practical reason,both Rawls and Habermas try to develop,through social contract procedure or ideal speech situation,Kant’s categorical imperative procedure,which is regarded as the demand of the practical reason itself,so as to establish a normative framework for regulating the public use of reason. However,they have different opinions on how to set up this framework. Habermas believes that a normative consensus should be formed on the bases of the same public reasons and under the ideal debilitative conditions;whereas Rawls argues that,in the justification of justice,the original deliberation of a "monologue"kind does not necessarily prevent the expression of the impartial moral point of view.What the citizens have achieved as a consensus,with yet incongruous concerns,is actually their requirement for a kind of public justification of complete and unified practical reason,under the condition of reasonable pluralism.
520[ ] |a 罗尔斯与哈贝马斯都深受康德的实践理性观念影响,试图通过契约程序或理想商谈情境去阐发被康德认为是体现了实践理性本身要求的绝对命令程序,来为理性的公共运用确立一个规范框架。他们在关于正义观念的辩护问题上的著名论争,实质是对于何种程序设置才能合理地反映一种不偏不倚的道德观点的分歧。哈贝马斯认为必须在理想商谈条件下经由公民平等讨论后在相同的公共理由之上形成的共识,才具有道德规范性;罗尔斯认为,在其对正义观念的辩护中,原初代表的"独白式"慎思并不必然会阻碍对不偏不倚道德观点的体现;并且公民基于各自的理由在正义观念上达成重叠共识,是合理多元条件下面向公民的完整统一的实践理性为正义观念作辩护的要求。
653[0 ] |a 罗尔斯
653[0 ] |a 哈贝马斯
653[0 ] |a 公共理由
653[0 ] |a 公共辩护
653[0 ] |a 合情理性
653[0 ] |a 理性
653[0 ] |a 重叠共识.
773[0 ] |t 南京大学学报(哲学·人文科学·社会科学), Journal of Nanjing University |g No. 3, 2015
890[ ] |a 0 |b 0 |c 0 |d 0