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The role of corporate governance in shaping accruals manipulation prior to acquisitions

The role of corporate governance in shaping accruals manipulation prior to acquisitions

 p327-p364 English
Tác giả CN Lehmann, Nico.
Nhan đề The role of corporate governance in shaping accruals manipulation prior to acquisitions / Nico Lehmann
Mô tả vật lý p327-p364
Tóm tắt Based on stock swap transactions involving public acquirers originating from the UK between 1998 and 2011, this paper investigates the role of corporate governance in shaping accruals manipulation prior to stock swap deals. In contrast to common claims that strong corporate governance constrains accruals manipulation, my results show that well-governed acquirers engage more aggressively in income-increasing accruals manipulation than those with weak governance. This finding is consistent with a role of corporate governance that incentivises managerial actions in the interests of firms’ shareholders. Overall, this finding highlights the setting-specific nature of the earnings management and corporate governance relation. My results are robust to different discretionary accrual models, differences in the firm s growth structure, merger and acquisition control variables, a control group of 100% cash acquirers, an analysis of buy-and-hold abnormal returns, and potential sample selection problems
Thuật ngữ chủ đề Kế toán-Nghiên cứu-TV ĐHHN
Thuật ngữ chủ đề Tài chính-Nghiên cứu-TV ĐHHN
Từ khóa tự do Managerial incentives.
Từ khóa tự do Share-based M&A transactions.
Từ khóa tự do Accrual-based earnings management.
Từ khóa tự do Corporate governance.
Nguồn trích Acounting and business research- 2016, Vol46, N.3
MARC
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362[ 0] |a Vol 46 (June 2016)
520[ ] |a Based on stock swap transactions involving public acquirers originating from the UK between 1998 and 2011, this paper investigates the role of corporate governance in shaping accruals manipulation prior to stock swap deals. In contrast to common claims that strong corporate governance constrains accruals manipulation, my results show that well-governed acquirers engage more aggressively in income-increasing accruals manipulation than those with weak governance. This finding is consistent with a role of corporate governance that incentivises managerial actions in the interests of firms’ shareholders. Overall, this finding highlights the setting-specific nature of the earnings management and corporate governance relation. My results are robust to different discretionary accrual models, differences in the firm s growth structure, merger and acquisition control variables, a control group of 100% cash acquirers, an analysis of buy-and-hold abnormal returns, and potential sample selection problems
650[1 7] |a Kế toán |x Nghiên cứu |2 TV ĐHHN
650[1 7] |a Tài chính |x Nghiên cứu |2 TV ĐHHN
653[ ] |a Managerial incentives.
653[ ] |a Share-based M&A transactions.
653[ 0] |a Accrual-based earnings management.
653[0 ] |a Corporate governance.
773[ 0] |t Acounting and business research |g 2016, Vol46, N.3
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