| 000 | 00000nab#a2200000ui#4500 |
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| 001 | 51070 |
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| 002 | 2 |
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| 004 | 946CB2AA-6104-4659-B71B-49EFE122473F |
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| 005 | 202007131432 |
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| 008 | 081223s2017 vm| vie |
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| 009 | 1 0 |
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| 035 | [ ] |a 1456361628 |
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| 039 | [ ] |a 20241209003258 |b idtocn |c 20200713143203 |d huongnt |y 20180302092802 |z huett |
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| 041 | [0 ] |a eng |
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| 100 | [1 ] |a X Ipino, Ioannis. |
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| 245 | [1 0] |a Mandatory IFRS adoption: the trade-off between accrual-based and real earnings management / |c Elisabetta Ipino & Antonio Parbonetti. |
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| 260 | [ ] |c 2017. |
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| 300 | [1 0] |a p. 91-121. |
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| 520 | [ ] |a This paper examines whether firms substituted real earnings management for accrual-based earnings management after the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) became mandatory. Using a sample of 101,331 firm-year observations from 33 countries between 2000 and 2010, we show that IFRS adoption came with the unintended consequence of certain firms substituting real earnings management for accrual-based earnings management, especially among firms in countries with strict enforcement regimes. Furthermore, we document that the trade-off is confined to EU countries in which strong firm-level characteristics (i.e. the firm-level mechanism of control, the market’s level of scrutiny, and firm-specific incentives to provide transparency) are coupled with strong enforcement. We also show that IFRS had an effect in countries outside the EU, albeit at a different time. Overall, the results suggest that accounting regulators’ efforts to increase earnings quality might have had the unintended consequence of increasing real earnings management activities. |
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| 653 | [ ] |a Accrual-based earnings management |
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| 653 | [ ] |a Real earnings management |
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| 653 | [ ] |a IFRS adoption |
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| 653 | [0 ] |a IFRS adoption in non-EU countries |
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| 700 | [ ] |a Antonio Parbonetti |
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| 773 | [0 ] |t Accounting and Business Research |g Volume 47, 2017 |
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| 890 | [ ] |a 0 |b 0 |c 0 |d 0 |
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