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Do analysts affect bad news timeliness?

Do analysts affect bad news timeliness?

 Young, Alex.
 2018.
 p. 171-189. English
Phân tíchAnalystsBad news timelinessBrokerage house mergersMôi giới
Tác giả CN Young, Alex.
Nhan đề Do analysts affect bad news timeliness? / Alex Young.
Thông tin xuất bản 2018.
Mô tả vật lý p. 171-189.
Tóm tắt I investigate the effect of analysts on the speed with which bad news is reflected in earnings. Intuitively, the more analysts that cover a firm, the more costly it will be for the firm to keep bad news suppressed. Thus, analyst coverage should positively affect bad news timeliness (BNT) (but not necessarily the differential timeliness of bad news over good news, or conditional conservatism). Using brokerage house mergers as a natural experiment with a difference-in-differences design, I find that an exogenous decrease in analyst coverage decreases BNT; that is, analysts positively affect BNT. The decrease in BNT is robust to controlling for unobserved firm heterogeneity, using a propensity score matched sample, persists for up to three years after the brokerage house merger, and is stronger for firms with relatively low analyst coverage before the merger. The result improves our understanding of how analysts affect a firm s information environment.
Thuật ngữ chủ đề Phân tích tin kinh tế
Từ khóa tự do Phân tích
Từ khóa tự do Analysts
Từ khóa tự do Bad news timeliness
Từ khóa tự do Brokerage house mergers
Từ khóa tự do Môi giới
Nguồn trích Accounting and Business Research - Vol.48, No.2
MARC
Hiển thị đầy đủ trường & trường con
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520[ ] |a I investigate the effect of analysts on the speed with which bad news is reflected in earnings. Intuitively, the more analysts that cover a firm, the more costly it will be for the firm to keep bad news suppressed. Thus, analyst coverage should positively affect bad news timeliness (BNT) (but not necessarily the differential timeliness of bad news over good news, or conditional conservatism). Using brokerage house mergers as a natural experiment with a difference-in-differences design, I find that an exogenous decrease in analyst coverage decreases BNT; that is, analysts positively affect BNT. The decrease in BNT is robust to controlling for unobserved firm heterogeneity, using a propensity score matched sample, persists for up to three years after the brokerage house merger, and is stronger for firms with relatively low analyst coverage before the merger. The result improves our understanding of how analysts affect a firm s information environment.
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