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Is Cash King for Sales Compensation Plans? Evidence from a Large-Scale Field Intervention

Is Cash King for Sales Compensation Plans? Evidence from a Large-Scale Field Intervention

 Viswanathan, Madhu.
 2018.
 p. 368-381. fr
Bán hàng.Chi phí.Ưu đãi.Mental accountingField experiments,Incentives,Nonmonetary compensation,Sales force,+ 1 từ khóa
Tác giả CN Viswanathan, Madhu.
Nhan đề Is Cash King for Sales Compensation Plans? Evidence from a Large-Scale Field Intervention / Madhu Viswanathan, Xiaolin Li, George John, and Om Narasimhan.
Thông tin xuất bản 2018.
Mô tả vật lý p. 368-381.
Tóm tắt The pervasive use of merchandise (i.e., noncash) incentives in sales compensation plans is an empirical and theoretical puzzle given the supposed superiority of cash incentives in the standard theory (i.e., principal–agent models) as well as the scant, and contradictory empirical evidence. The authors conducted a large-scale field intervention that switched 580 salespeople at a large frozen food manufacturer away from their cash plus “merchandise points” bonus to a commensurate all-cash bonus. After controlling for salesperson, seasonality, year, and target effects, the authors estimate that sales, on average, dropped by 4.36%. Furthermore, they estimated individual-level sales changes and effort changes to validate the incentive–effort–sales causal chain. The results show that the top salespeople experienced the largest drops in sales. A post-intervention survey of social and individual difference variables reveals that salespeople from households with less discretionary financial resources and those who think more abstractly about the uses of cash income exhibited smaller reductions in effort and sales. Although the absence of a control group prevents the authors from making strong causal inferences, this set of results nevertheless provides descriptive and suggestive evidence for separate mental accounts as the most promising explanation for the greater utility provided by merchandise incentives.
Từ khóa tự do Bán hàng.
Từ khóa tự do Chi phí.
Từ khóa tự do Ưu đãi.
Từ khóa tự do Mental accounting
Từ khóa tự do Field experiments,
Từ khóa tự do Incentives,
Từ khóa tự do Nonmonetary compensation,
Từ khóa tự do Sales force,
Từ khóa tự do Kế toán.
Tác giả(bs) CN Narasimhan, Om.
Tác giả(bs) CN John, George.
Tác giả(bs) CN Li, Xiaolin.
Nguồn trích Journal of Marketing Research: - June 2018, Vol. 55, No. 3.
MARC
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041[0 ] |a fr
044[ ] |a fr
100[1 ] |a Viswanathan, Madhu.
245[1 0] |a Is Cash King for Sales Compensation Plans? Evidence from a Large-Scale Field Intervention / |c Madhu Viswanathan, Xiaolin Li, George John, and Om Narasimhan.
260[ ] |c 2018.
300[1 0] |a p. 368-381.
520[ ] |a The pervasive use of merchandise (i.e., noncash) incentives in sales compensation plans is an empirical and theoretical puzzle given the supposed superiority of cash incentives in the standard theory (i.e., principal–agent models) as well as the scant, and contradictory empirical evidence. The authors conducted a large-scale field intervention that switched 580 salespeople at a large frozen food manufacturer away from their cash plus “merchandise points” bonus to a commensurate all-cash bonus. After controlling for salesperson, seasonality, year, and target effects, the authors estimate that sales, on average, dropped by 4.36%. Furthermore, they estimated individual-level sales changes and effort changes to validate the incentive–effort–sales causal chain. The results show that the top salespeople experienced the largest drops in sales. A post-intervention survey of social and individual difference variables reveals that salespeople from households with less discretionary financial resources and those who think more abstractly about the uses of cash income exhibited smaller reductions in effort and sales. Although the absence of a control group prevents the authors from making strong causal inferences, this set of results nevertheless provides descriptive and suggestive evidence for separate mental accounts as the most promising explanation for the greater utility provided by merchandise incentives.
653[0 ] |a Bán hàng.
653[0 ] |a Chi phí.
653[0 ] |a Ưu đãi.
653[0 ] |a Mental accounting
653[0 ] |a Field experiments,
653[0 ] |a Incentives,
653[0 ] |a Nonmonetary compensation,
653[0 ] |a Sales force,
653[0 ] |a Kế toán.
700[ ] |a Narasimhan, Om.
700[1 ] |a John, George.
700[1 ] |a Li, Xiaolin.
773[0 ] |t Journal of Marketing Research: |g June 2018, Vol. 55, No. 3.
890[ ] |a 0 |b 0 |c 0 |d 0