TRA CỨU
Các bộ sưu tập
Skip Navigation Links.
Thư mục - Vốn tư liệu
Marking imprecision, conveying surprise

Marking imprecision, conveying surprise : Like between hedging and mirativity

 Beltrama, Andrea.
 Cambridge University Press, 2019.
 Britain : p. 1-34. English ISSN: 00222267
PolysemyEvidentialityMirativityCommon groundDiscourse particles
Tác giả CN Beltrama, Andrea.
Nhan đề Marking imprecision, conveying surprise : Like between hedging and mirativity / The Journal of the Linguistics Association of Great Britain.
Thông tin xuất bản Britain :Cambridge University Press,2019.
Thông tin xuất bản 2019.
Mô tả vật lý p. 1-34.
Tóm tắt Mirative expressions, which mark surprising information (DeLancey 1997), are often expressed through linguistic forms that are also used to encode other, seemingly unrelated, meanings – e.g. evidential markers that mark lack of direct evidence (Turkish: Slobin & Aksu 1982, Peterson 2010; Cheyenne: Rett & Murray 2013; Cuzco Quechua: Faller 2002; Ostyak: Nikolaeva 1999; among others). In this paper, we show that the English particle like features a parallel polysemy between a mirative use and its better-known hedging use, which expresses weakened commitment to the strict denotation of a linguistic expression. After presenting several diagnostics that point to a genuine empirical difference between the hedging and mirative functions of like, we propose that both uses widen the size of a contextually restricted set, admitting elements that were previously excluded. More specifically, hedging like expands the set of ‘similar enough’ interpretations that we can apply to a linguistic expression in a context, including interpretations that we would normally consider to be too different from the context at hand. Mirative like, on the other hand, expands the set of worlds that we are willing to consider as candidates for the actual world in the conversation, resulting in the inclusion of worlds that interlocutors have previously ruled out due to perceived outlandishness. We therefore suggest that the two uses are best treated as sharing a common semantic kernel, deriving hedging and mirativity as effects of the particular type of object to which like applies.
Từ khóa tự do Polysemy
Từ khóa tự do Evidentiality
Từ khóa tự do Mirativity
Từ khóa tự do Common ground
Từ khóa tự do Discourse particles
Nguồn trích Journal of Linguistics- No.55 (2019)
MARC
Hiển thị đầy đủ trường & trường con
TagGiá trị
00000000nas#a2200000ui#4500
00158403
0022
004C666B173-61A3-4F4A-A89F-B21E36072719
005202007171104
008081223s2019 vm| vie
0091 0
022[ ] |a 00222267
035[ ] |a 1456367988
039[ ] |a 20241209120618 |b idtocn |c 20200717110422 |d huongnt |y 20200401113514 |z thuvt
041[0 ] |a eng
044[ ] |a enk
100[1 ] |a Beltrama, Andrea.
245[1 0] |a Marking imprecision, conveying surprise : |b Like between hedging and mirativity / |c The Journal of the Linguistics Association of Great Britain.
260[ ] |a Britain : |b Cambridge University Press, |c 2019.
260[ ] |c 2019.
300[ ] |a p. 1-34.
310[ ] |a Hàng quý.
520[ ] |a Mirative expressions, which mark surprising information (DeLancey 1997), are often expressed through linguistic forms that are also used to encode other, seemingly unrelated, meanings – e.g. evidential markers that mark lack of direct evidence (Turkish: Slobin & Aksu 1982, Peterson 2010; Cheyenne: Rett & Murray 2013; Cuzco Quechua: Faller 2002; Ostyak: Nikolaeva 1999; among others). In this paper, we show that the English particle like features a parallel polysemy between a mirative use and its better-known hedging use, which expresses weakened commitment to the strict denotation of a linguistic expression. After presenting several diagnostics that point to a genuine empirical difference between the hedging and mirative functions of like, we propose that both uses widen the size of a contextually restricted set, admitting elements that were previously excluded. More specifically, hedging like expands the set of ‘similar enough’ interpretations that we can apply to a linguistic expression in a context, including interpretations that we would normally consider to be too different from the context at hand. Mirative like, on the other hand, expands the set of worlds that we are willing to consider as candidates for the actual world in the conversation, resulting in the inclusion of worlds that interlocutors have previously ruled out due to perceived outlandishness. We therefore suggest that the two uses are best treated as sharing a common semantic kernel, deriving hedging and mirativity as effects of the particular type of object to which like applies.
653[0 ] |a Polysemy
653[0 ] |a Evidentiality
653[0 ] |a Mirativity
653[0 ] |a Common ground
653[0 ] |a Discourse particles
773[ ] |t Journal of Linguistics |g No.55 (2019)
890[ ] |a 0 |b 0 |c 0 |d 0