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Does obfuscating excessive CEO pay work? The influence of remuneration report readability on say-on-pay votes

Does obfuscating excessive CEO pay work? The influence of remuneration report readability on say-on-pay votes

 Hooghiemstra, Reggy
 2017.
 p. 695 - 729. English
DisclosureReadabilitySay on payShareholder votes
Tác giả CN Hooghiemstra, Reggy
Nhan đề Does obfuscating excessive CEO pay work? The influence of remuneration report readability on say-on-pay votes/ Reggy Hooghiemstra, Yu Flora Kuang, Bo Qin
Thông tin xuất bản 2017.
Mô tả vật lý p. 695 - 729.
Tóm tắt This paper assesses whether reducing ‘readability’ is an effective obfuscation strategy for influencing the level of shareholder say-on-pay voting dissent in firms with excessive CEO pay. Based on a sample of UK-listed firms, our results indicate that in cases of excessive CEO pay, a less readable remuneration report is associated with reduced say-on-pay voting dissent. However, the effect of the obfuscation strategy diminishes as institutional ownership increases. Using obscurely written remuneration reports may even backfire (i.e. associated with increased voting dissent) when a firm’s majority shares are held by institutional investors. Our results are robust to controlling for compensation contract complexity as well as other alternative explanations. The results are also robust to various controls for endogeneity including a two-stage instrumental variable approach and propensity-score matching. Our findings offer regulatory implications that regulators could minimize the use of ‘obfuscation’ in pay-related disclosures by prescribing how information is to be presented.
Từ khóa tự do Disclosure
Từ khóa tự do Readability
Từ khóa tự do Say on pay
Từ khóa tự do Shareholder votes
Tác giả(bs) CN Hooghiemstra, Reggy
Tác giả(bs) CN Kuang, Yu Flora
Tác giả(bs) CN Qin, Bo
Nguồn trích Accounting and Business Research- vol.47, no. 6/2017
MARC
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520[ ] |a This paper assesses whether reducing ‘readability’ is an effective obfuscation strategy for influencing the level of shareholder say-on-pay voting dissent in firms with excessive CEO pay. Based on a sample of UK-listed firms, our results indicate that in cases of excessive CEO pay, a less readable remuneration report is associated with reduced say-on-pay voting dissent. However, the effect of the obfuscation strategy diminishes as institutional ownership increases. Using obscurely written remuneration reports may even backfire (i.e. associated with increased voting dissent) when a firm’s majority shares are held by institutional investors. Our results are robust to controlling for compensation contract complexity as well as other alternative explanations. The results are also robust to various controls for endogeneity including a two-stage instrumental variable approach and propensity-score matching. Our findings offer regulatory implications that regulators could minimize the use of ‘obfuscation’ in pay-related disclosures by prescribing how information is to be presented.
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