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Regulatory incentives and financial reporting quality in public healthcare organisations

Regulatory incentives and financial reporting quality in public healthcare organisations

 Margaret, J. Greenwood.
 2017.
 p. 831-855. English
regulationhealthcarepublic sectordiscretionary accruals
Tác giả CN Margaret, J. Greenwood.
Nhan đề Regulatory incentives and financial reporting quality in public healthcare organisations / Margaret J. Greenwood, Lei Tao, Richard M. Baylis
Thông tin xuất bản 2017.
Mô tả vật lý p. 831-855.
Tóm tắt English National Health Service Foundation Trusts are subject to a regulatory regime in which the level of monitoring and intervention is determined by performance against two key performance metrics: a ‘financial risk rating’, based on a number of performance metrics, such as the reported surplus margin and return on assets, and a ‘prudential borrowing limit’. In this paper, we investigate the variation in financial reporting quality, proxied by discretionary accruals, with the incentives introduced by this regime. We find: first, that discretionary accruals are managed to report small surpluses; second, that, consistent with the avoidance of regulatory intervention in both the short and medium term, discretionary accruals are more positive when pre-managed performance is below intervention triggering thresholds and more negative when well above threshold; third, that, despite a move away from financial breakeven as the primary performance objective, there remains an aversion to small loss reporting. We further find that the level of discretionary accruals is driven by two metrics of strategic significance: the surplus margin (a measure of retained earnings) and the prudential borrowing limit (a measure of borrowing capacity).
Từ khóa tự do regulation
Từ khóa tự do healthcare
Từ khóa tự do public sector
Từ khóa tự do discretionary accruals
Tác giả(bs) CN Lei Tao
Nguồn trích Accounting and Business Research - Volume 47, 2017 - Issue 7
MARC
Hiển thị đầy đủ trường & trường con
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520[ ] |a English National Health Service Foundation Trusts are subject to a regulatory regime in which the level of monitoring and intervention is determined by performance against two key performance metrics: a ‘financial risk rating’, based on a number of performance metrics, such as the reported surplus margin and return on assets, and a ‘prudential borrowing limit’. In this paper, we investigate the variation in financial reporting quality, proxied by discretionary accruals, with the incentives introduced by this regime. We find: first, that discretionary accruals are managed to report small surpluses; second, that, consistent with the avoidance of regulatory intervention in both the short and medium term, discretionary accruals are more positive when pre-managed performance is below intervention triggering thresholds and more negative when well above threshold; third, that, despite a move away from financial breakeven as the primary performance objective, there remains an aversion to small loss reporting. We further find that the level of discretionary accruals is driven by two metrics of strategic significance: the surplus margin (a measure of retained earnings) and the prudential borrowing limit (a measure of borrowing capacity).
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