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When Showrooming Increases Retailer Profit

When Showrooming Increases Retailer Profit

 Kuksov, Dmitri.
 2018.
 p. 459-473. English
MarketingDịch vụ.Service.Game theory.Channel coordination.Free riding.Retail competition.Showrooming.+ 1 từ khóa
Tác giả CN Kuksov, Dmitri.
Nhan đề When Showrooming Increases Retailer Profit / Dmitri Kuksov, Chenxi Liao.
Thông tin xuất bản 2018.
Mô tả vật lý p. 459-473.
Tóm tắt Showrooming, the phenomenon of consumers visiting a brick-and-mortar (B&M) store to learn about products but then buying online to obtain lower prices, is attracting increased attention both in business practice and in academic literature. It is considered a major threat to the B&M retailers, and determining “how to fight it” seems to be the only consideration. However, the manufacturer’s need for retail informational services has always been one of the essential reasons for retailers to exist and is a means for retailers to achieve profitability. The popular arguments about the threat of showrooming ignore the strategic role of the manufacturer in the distribution channel. This article analytically shows that when the manufacturer’s decisions are considered (i.e., when the manufacturer–retailer contract is endogenous), consumers’ ability to engage in showrooming may lead to increased, rather than decreased, profitability for B&M retailer(s). Thus, retail efforts to restrict showrooming behavior may be misguided. This result holds even if the manufacturer is restricted to wholesale-only contracts and is not allowed to price discriminate between channels.
Thuật ngữ chủ đề Marketing-Retail competition.
Từ khóa tự do Dịch vụ.
Từ khóa tự do Service.
Từ khóa tự do Game theory.
Từ khóa tự do Channel coordination.
Từ khóa tự do Free riding.
Từ khóa tự do Retail competition.
Từ khóa tự do Showrooming.
Từ khóa tự do Cạnh tranh bán lẻ.
Nguồn trích Journal of Marketing Research:- August 2018, Vol. 55, No. 4
MARC
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100[1 ] |a Kuksov, Dmitri.
245[1 0] |a When Showrooming Increases Retailer Profit / |c Dmitri Kuksov, Chenxi Liao.
260[ ] |c 2018.
300[1 0] |a p. 459-473.
520[ ] |a Showrooming, the phenomenon of consumers visiting a brick-and-mortar (B&M) store to learn about products but then buying online to obtain lower prices, is attracting increased attention both in business practice and in academic literature. It is considered a major threat to the B&M retailers, and determining “how to fight it” seems to be the only consideration. However, the manufacturer’s need for retail informational services has always been one of the essential reasons for retailers to exist and is a means for retailers to achieve profitability. The popular arguments about the threat of showrooming ignore the strategic role of the manufacturer in the distribution channel. This article analytically shows that when the manufacturer’s decisions are considered (i.e., when the manufacturer–retailer contract is endogenous), consumers’ ability to engage in showrooming may lead to increased, rather than decreased, profitability for B&M retailer(s). Thus, retail efforts to restrict showrooming behavior may be misguided. This result holds even if the manufacturer is restricted to wholesale-only contracts and is not allowed to price discriminate between channels.
650[1 0] |a Marketing |x Retail competition.
653[0 ] |a Dịch vụ.
653[0 ] |a Service.
653[0 ] |a Game theory.
653[0 ] |a Channel coordination.
653[0 ] |a Free riding.
653[0 ] |a Retail competition.
653[0 ] |a Showrooming.
653[0 ] |a Cạnh tranh bán lẻ.
773[0 ] |t Journal of Marketing Research: |g August 2018, Vol. 55, No. 4
890[ ] |a 0 |b 0 |c 0 |d 0